The Bible According to Ray, part 3

I must apologize for taking so long about this, but I have hesitated before a difficulty. The next words in Ray’s theorem, “but not in matters of science or history”, are ambiguous: they can mean either (a) something stupid or (b) something bad. Should I be charitable and present only the stupid meaning? Or should I be thorough and raise the specter of the evil?

After due consideration, I think it would be confusing to my reader if I did not comment on every possible meaning, and confusion is always in favor of the Moose.

The Bad Meaning. Let’s get the bad stuff out of the way first. If you take “in matters of science and history” as referring to passages in Scripture that talk about science and history—that’s taking the words “materially” for those of you who speak Aristotle—then we can put this little syllogism together:

Scripture is inerrant in matters of faith (and morals);
Scripture is not inerrant in matters of science and history;
Therefore, no matters of science or history are matters of faith.

In other words, let’s say that all the matters of faith are in this room. This is the room of things where Scripture is inerrant. All the matters of science and history are outside the room, out there where Scripture is not inerrant. Faith never has to do with science or history.

So, for example, Jesus’ resurrection is not a “historical” event, and that the world has not been around for an infinite length of time is not in any way related to “science”.

To put it more generally, Scripture is inerrant about the “squishy” subjects like our interior convictions or how we should behave, but not inerrant about the “hard” subjects like history or science. If it is subject to objective verification, then it is not one of the things that Scripture has authority about.

Some folks do think this way. Some are intimidated by the idea that modern discoveries in history or science could disprove the Catholic faith, and find it more comfortable to separate the faith out into its own little, inaccessible box. Others think that all religions arise from an interior human impulse and have no objective truth about them. Either way, it’s handy to bifurcate the brain into the “religious” side and the “factual” side.

Hard to argue with the bad folks. Once a man has performed this intellectual lobotomy on himself, there is not much to say beyond “please” and “thank you”.

The Stupid Meaning. If you take the words “in matters of science and history” as referring not to particular passages but to the reason why Scripture is or isn’t inerrant—taking the words “formally” for you Aristotle buffs—then there is no need to dial 134. [That’s the number for the Inquisition, by the way, 134—only call if there is a true emergency.]

In other words, it may well be that Scripture speaks authoritatively about something historical, but the reason Scripture has authority in that case is because the historical event in question is related to faith. Scripture does not speak authoritatively about historical events considered as historical events, but only insofar as they are matters of faith.

Confused? Perfect.

The bottom line is that we are right back at the absurdity I talked about in Part I. If you want to know whether we should believe what Scripture says about historical event X, then you need to have a list of all the things we are supposed to believe; you check the list, and if historical event X is on that list then you should believe Scripture. In other words, you have to know whether you should believe it in order to find out whether you should believe it.

As vicious as this circle may be, the folks who believe it are not usually vicious. They’re more like the wimpy guy in a bad neighborhood who keeps a pit bull in the yard because he’s scared of criminals. Otherwise nice people buy into this nasty circle not because they are nasty but because they are scared.

Big, bad scientists or even meaner historians could come along at any second and disprove something Scripture says! No need to worry: if somebody proves that X is not historical, we can just delete that from our list of “matters of faith” and then we’re not committed to saying that Scripture is right about it. After all, no scientist or historian can say what should be on our list of things to believe. What would they appeal to?

Scripture?

Other folks are scared in a better way, but still scared. They see that there are some BIG problems with saying that Scripture is completely inerrant, and they are afraid that if they say Scripture is inerrant then people will be scandalized by the problems and go away. They don’t want to be unfaithful to the Church or a scandal to the faithful, so they get as close as they can to affirming the inerrancy of Scripture without either compromising their intellectual integrity or causing scandal to others.

I have a lotta lotta sympathy for this last group. They are genuinely good people. This is just the Ignoramus Blog and no place for hashing out the subtle difficulties they see in Scripture, but I hope this series of posts has at least shown that they should not buy into Ray Moose’s disastrous theorem.

The Moose solution is to take all authority away from Scripture. To say that Scripture is authoritative in a given place, we have to have our list of “matters of faith”, but Scripture itself cannot tell us what to put on that list. It has no real authority, ultimately. And that is not what this last, good group of scholars wants.

Please, gang—I know I haven’t offered a fix for all your problems, but I beg you, for the sake of everything you are really trying to achieve:

IGNORE RAY MOOSE!

The Bible According to Ray, part 2

After a great deal of thought, I finally conceded that Ray might be onto something when he says that Scripture is inerrant in faith AND morals.

At first I wanted to say that the distinction is absurd. We saw in the last post that every area Scripture is inerrant is ipso facto talking about a matter of faith, so how can Ray separate out another area of biblical inerrancy? If we take “morals” to mean “what we must believe about morality”, which is a subheading of “what we must believe”, which is the same thing as the area called “faith”, then Ray’s distinction is just nonsense.

But then I saw a way out. It could be that “faith” refers to what we must believe, while “morals” refers to what we must do. Hang with me, here. It could be that “morals” does not refer to Scripture saying “the moral thing to do is X” but to Scripture saying “Do X.” The first case would be something we must believe, while the second case would be something we must do, and Scripture could have authority with regard to both.

Of course, we do tend to associate the word “inerrant” with propositions that are either true or false. If someone said something erroneous, our first thought is that he said something false; if someone is said to be inerrant, our first thought is that he says things that are true. And if “Scripture is inerrant” refers only to statements that are true or false, then that kinda slams the door on my “way out”.

Two things incline me to believe that my “way out” is the right way to go. First, the idea of “error” is broad enough to include bad advice. If someone says “the moral thing to do is X” when the moral thing to do is not-X, we can say that he “erred” in the broader sense of going in the wrong direction. He “steered me wrong”, as the saying goes.

Second, Ray Moose just isn’t smart enough to be wrong 100% of the time. It would take a genius. He’s bound to be right once in a while. And as we’ll see in the upcoming posts, I just can’t find anywhere else where he even might be right on this issue, so I figure this must be it!

The Bible According to Ray

The most popular position on the authority of Scripture is that Scripture has no authority at all. It is a human document like other human documents, and like other human documents it is sometimes right and sometimes wrong.

The second-most popular position on the authority of Scripture is that Scripture is one-hundred-percent authoritative. Everything that Scripture says must be believed: it is a matter of faith.

Both of these positions are self-consistent, rational positions that a thoughtful person can hold. They can’t both be true, but they are both logical.

However, the third-most popular position about the authority of Scripture emerges from the offices of Ray Moose and is disseminated through his accomplices, both the knowing ones and the unknowing. This third position enjoys neither the proud rationality of the first nor the thoroughgoing consistency of the second, but muddles along in typical Moose fashion. Here it is:

Scripture is inerrant in matters of faith and moral, but not in science or history.

Now that doesn’t sound so unreasonable, you say—it actually has a rather moderate ring to it.

That, my friend, is the hallmark of Ray’s work. He always manages to sound moderate so that his opponents will always sound extreme. Only when you unpack the meaning of his words do you realize that he has sacrificed real intelligibility for apparent moderation.

So let’s look at this Moosian theory piece by piece, starting with the phrase, “Scripture is inerrant.” When we say that Scripture is “inerrant”, we do not mean that we have checked all through it and found no mistakes; in that sense, lots of people write “inerrant” texts, and lots of school-children turn back “inerrant” quizzes. No, what we mean is that Scripture has authority so that we have to believe what it says. The second-most popular position mentioned above is that Scripture is entirely inerrant, meaning that it is all authoritative: we have to believe by faith everything that Scripture says.

The Moosian theory tries to limit Scripture’s clout by saying that it has authority when it speaks about some things but not when it speaks about others. This is all very well: my geography teacher has a kind of authority when he speaks about geography but not when he speaks about mathematics. Perhaps Scripture has authority when it speaks about politics but not when it speaks about astronomy.

But let’s look closely at the first phrase Ray uses to limit Scripture’s authority: “Scripture is inerrant in matters of faith....” In this context, “matter” means the subject matter, i.e., what the text is about. So “matters of faith” means subjects that have to do with what we believe by faith.

Now we can put together the meaning of “Scripture is inerrant” with the meaning of “in matters of faith.” Here it goes:

What Scripture says must be believed by faith when it talks about subjects that have to do with what we believe by faith.

WARNING: DO NOT READ THE PRECEDING SENTENCE TOO MANY TIMES, OR YOU WILL GET DIZZY AND FALL DOWN. IT IS A CIRCLE—A VICIOUS ONE.

To find out whether a biblical statement is one of the things we must believe you have to find out whether it is talking about the things we must believe; to find out whether it is talking about the things we must believe you have to know all the things we must believe and check to see if this biblical statement is talking about those things; to know all the things we must believe you have to know whether this biblical statement is one of the things we must believe!

The Moosian theory on Scripture is like the man who says, “You can always know whether I am telling the truth, and here’s how: I always tell the truth when I’m talking about one of the subjects about which I tell the truth.” How helpful is that?

Confused? Let’s look at it from another angle. Suppose there is a statement in Scripture that we have to believe by faith. The very fact that we have to believe this statement by faith tells you that it’s talking about a subject that has to do with what we believe by faith. So any statement in Scripture that we have to believe by faith is a statement relating to matters of faith. If Ray tells us that Scripture has authority in matters of faith, he hasn’t told us a darn thing.

Coming up next: Ray Moose makes a VALID distinction!

Moose Preserves

A lunchtime mystery: the label on this red glop says, “Strawberry Preserves”, but the small print claims, “No preservatives added.”

Come again?

OK, Ray, here’s the scoop. Sugar is a preservative. Your little game is exposed, right here on the Ignoramus Blog.

SPANK!

KIDNAPPED - Conclusion

By now, I fervently hope that my reader is convinced that Ray Moose is in fact behind the mind-bogglingly silly article on Aquinas’s “five ways”. After all, a magazine’s reputation is at stake: the “James Kidd” who penned that piece would make a fine associate editor for This Crock Magazine, but is an embarrassment for the good name of Catholic Answers.

But more than that, a man’s life is at stake. What has been done with the real James Kidd?

Who can say? Karl Keating, if you are reading this—for heaven’s sake, DO something!

KIDDNAPPED, part 4

There. The worst is done. We have reviewed all the silliest moments in Ray’s ridiculous satire on Thomas Aquinas, and have exposed them to—well, not to the brilliant light of truth exactly, but to the 40-watt bulb of common knowledge. The unpleasant work is over.

In this post, I want to highlight what is actually a legitimate question from Ray Moose:

But the problem is with Thomas’s next statement: "We call this being God." As we will see with the rest of the five ways, this is an enormous logical leap. While it is correct that the A-B-C string of movers proves that there must be a First Mover, how do we know that it is identical to the First Mover of X-Y-Z? Couldn’t there be as many First Movers as there are lines of movers? How do we know that there is only one Unmoved Mover? And even if there is only one, how do we know that it still exists or that it is to be identified as God? The answers to these questions are not found in the first way itself.

I remember this question coming up the first time I read Aquinas. The solution depends on having some experience with the way Aquinas proceeds. He states his question in very precise terms, and then answers only the question he has stated, leaving any further points one might want to know about for a later article. So the question to ask is, What question does St. Thomas actually answer in the Summa Theologica, Question 1, Article 3?

A clue can be found in his little summa for real beginners, the Compendium of Theology. In the third chapter of that little book, he gives the same argument from motion that we know as the “first way”. It is not until chapter fifteen that he shows that “God” is not a species predicated of many individuals.

In other words, the “first way”—or any of the five ways—shows that “God” exists in the same way that archeological digs can show that “man” existed long ago. The archeological dig does not show us which man exists, or that only one man existed, but that “man”—the species “man”—existed. Similarly, the five ways demonstrate that “God” exists, but for all we know “God” could be the name of a species: there could be any number of individual “Gods” within the species “God”.

One of my professors at the ITI used to emphasize this point by refusing to capitalize “god” in his translation of the five ways. The question St. Thomas asks in the Summa, Question 1, Article 3 is “Does god exist?”; only later do we find out that God alone is god, and there can be no other.

In point of fact, this is true of every argument for God’s existence. Whether it be the ontological argument or the cosmological argument, the appeal to reason or the appeal to beauty, the argument from morality or the argument from history—all of them conclude initially to the existence of the divine. But atheism is never just the rejection of the God of Jacob, but the rejection of any divine element in the cosmos. If there is even a small deity, even a god of the meadow, atheism fails.

Perhaps for cultural reasons, people who lose their faith in the God of Jacob rarely lapse into polytheism: they “convert” to atheism. Conversely, people who forsake atheism rarely take to worshipping a local deity: most leap over the logical hurdles to embrace the God of Christianity.

So for apologetical purposes, the fact that arguments for God’s existence conclude only to the existence of “god” is not a problem. It is not a problem with Descartes’ argument (which has problems of its own), and it is not a problem with Aquinas’s arguments.

OK, credit where credit is due: good question Ray—even though I know you didn’t mean to provoke an inquiry into truth!

KIDDNAPPED: an excursus to parts 2 and 3

As we have seen, the Moose claims that Aquinas's five ways would not work as demonstrations because they all begin from sense experience. More than that, he claims that Aquinas himself shared the skepticism of modern philosophy with regard to sense experience, and so did not even intend the five ways to be taken as demonstrations. Ignorant though I am, and unable to reckon with the deep things of philosophy, even I can see through that claim for the anachronistic--um, anachronism that it is.

In this post I want to develop an aside to this line of thought. It occurs to me that Ray's skepticism about the senses is not only historically wrong as applied to Aquinas, but more or less irrelevant.

Suppose we assume that Ray Moose is right, and that Descartes's evil deceiver could be tricking us into believing that we are sensing things when in fact we are not. For the purposes of argument, let's assume that the evil deceiver is tricking us, all the time. Everything that I think is real life is in fact a dream or mirage conjured up by this deceiver. What happens if we re-boot the five ways on this operating system?

The 1st Way. Strange though it may sound, my dreams do have some reality about them: they are real dreams, at least. And the images in my dreams do move. An image of a bird that is presented as over there is then presented as over here, and certain actions in my dream are presented as having a beginning, a middle, and an end. In other words, my dream has certain potentialities that are gradually realized as actualities: the dream is potentially this way, and then later is actually this way.

Well, folks, that is motion in the Aristotelian sense of the word. And the existence of motion in this sense is all the premise that Aquinas needs to get the first way off the ground!

The 2nd Way. On the supposition of the evil deciever--let's just call him the ED--the ED causes certain things to happen in my mind, and then these things in my mind cause certain reactions in me. By golly, we have a chain of efficient causes! And that's all the premise Aquinas needs to get the second way going.

The 3rd Way. My dreams are very ephemeral things. Sometimes I have an image of one thing, sometimes of another, and there is no necessity that any one image will continue to have even that shadowy sort of being that mental images have. The images in my mind are contingent beings.

How about that? I know that contingent beings exist, and that is the starting point for the third way! We're really on a roll here, despite ED's best efforts.

The 4th Way. My dreams have only the being that mental beings have, which is very slight indeed. I, on the other hand, am self-evidently a substance--that which "stands under" (substare) accidents like mental beings. So I have more goodness and nobility than do my dreams.

On the other hand, ED is obviously a higher and more powerful creature than I am, because he is able to create an entire virtual world for me to enjoy (or suffer) and can even place that world into my mind. I can't know anything at all outside my mind! So despite his proclivity for deceiving disembodied minds like me, Ed's nature is really nobler than mine, and thus has more goodness as a nature.

Bingo! We have a gradation of goodness and nobility, the very premise we needed to rev up the fourth way.

The 5th Way. The fifth way is the one that Ed's tricks really do comprimise. Aquinas's argument demands that we have real knowledge of real things that really act for real ends. But by an odd coincidence, we don't need the fifth way because we have already assumed its conclusion as true! Because we assumed that Ed is working me over, we already know that the things I "perceive" in the "world" are directed by an intelligent agent who caused them. It may sound odd to conclude that Ed is that which "all call God", but I think Aquinas would actually be comfortable with that conclusion at this stage of the game.

What do I mean by "this stage of the game"? More on that in the next post.

And the conclusion is.... Ray Moose and his buddy Ed can throw the works at us, and Thomas Aquinas's five ways are affected not at all. Every one of them concludes--unless you count the fifth way, in which case Ed supplies the truth of the conclusion for us.

In other words, Ray Moose's objection about starting from sense perception is not only historically ignorant, but just--well, irrelevant.

And the best thing to do with the irrelevant is: IGNORE IT. Maybe it will go away.

KIDDNAPPED, part 3

In my last post I talked about the silliest moment in Ray’s whole piece, but it is so closely tied to the second silliest moment that I really should talk about that too. At the end of the article, having argued that Aquinas did not intend his five ways to be demonstrations, Ray concludes:

Fine, you may say, but surely Thomas has an actual proof of God somewhere. Surely he didn’t leave us defenseless against the atheists and agnostics of the world. Surely he had something to say to the nonbelievers of his own day.
Well, yes and no. Thomas did not write any short treatise on the existence of God that one could whip out of one’s pocket when confronted by an atheist. Despite his voluminous writing, none of it is meant to stand alone. Nonetheless, we can piece together and paraphrase some of his other arguments in various writings to come up with a solid, irrefutable proof that not only does God exist, but he cannot not exist. That is, saying that God does not exist is a contradiction in terms. But that’s the subject of another article.

According to Ray Moose, when we “piece together and paraphrase” things Thomas says here and there, we come up with a solid proof that “not only does God exist, but he cannot not exist” because “saying that God does not exist is a contradiction in terms.” This argument, he maintains, is one that does not start from our experience of the world outside our minds, but from abstract concepts.

This kind of argument for God’s existence is called the “ontological argument”, while the argument that begins from what we sense in the world is called the “cosmological argument”. As you can see by clicking the link I just gave, Thomas Aquinas is listed among those who oppose the ontological argument.

It is odd that Ray does not mention this, because Aquinas deals with the kind of ontological argument Ray suggests just before he gives his own demonstrations for God’s existence, in Question 1, Article 1. In fact, he considers several arguments that do not begin from sense experience but from abstract ideas and conclude that “saying that God does not exist is a contradiction in terms.” The most famous of Aquinas’s predecessors to make this argument was St. Anselm of Laon, but others had come up with similar approaches. If I had to guess, I would say that Ray Moose is thinking of the argument for God’s existence given by Descartes in the Meditations, but the principle Aquinas uses to respond to St. Anselm would apply just as well to Descartes.

So we can’t scrap together the argument Ray wants from Thomas Aquinas’s writings; in fact, he is famous for opposing that kind of argument; in fact, he opposes it in the same Question of the Summa that Ray discusses in his article. It’s just—well, ignorant!

KIDDNAPPED, part 2

How even to begin? How to approach such an admirable depth of ignorance, such a blinding Ray of intellectual darkness? But I have promised my readers, so in this post I will present the silliest moment in the Moose’s recent article:

Finally, the five ways—not proofs—take as a starting point the validity of our sense perception, which is enough to disqualify them as proofs per se. We believe the information we obtain by means of our five senses is accurate, despite occasional mistakes (mirages, dreams, etc.). But while we usually have no good reason to doubt the accuracy of our senses, at the end of the day we accept the information on faith. There is no way to prove beyond all possible doubt that our senses are true; there’s always the logical possibility that Descartes’s "evil deceiver" is making you think you’re reading this article right now when in fact you are not. The only true proofs we do have—for instance, that vertical angles are congruent—are mathematical ones that hold true even if our senses are giving us false information. Thus, any argument that assumes the validity of sense perception (including the five ways) is conditional upon the accuracy of our senses.
Thus, it seems that Aquinas did not intend the five ways to be logical, mathematical demonstrations but arguments for something that we already accept.

Moose ick to my ears. It is very, VERY tempting to get into the whole can-we-trust-our-senses debate, but I won’t do it. The question here is not whether we can trust our senses, but whether Thomas Aquinas believed that we could trust our senses. Nonetheless, I can’t help putting these two statements in parallel:

“There is no way to prove beyond all possible doubt that our senses are true; there’s always the logical possibility that Descartes’s 'evil deceiver' is making you think you’re reading this article right now when in fact you are not.”—Ray Moose

“Ever since the creation of the world his invisible nature, namely, his eternal power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made.”—Romans 1:20

OK, let’s review some history. Way back in the day, Plato taught that our knowledge of the world comes from ideas that are infused into us before we are born. His student Aristotle disagreed, and argued instead that all of our knowledge comes to us through our senses; before a man has sensed anything his mind is a “blank slate”, Aristotle said, a tabula rasa.

Now, ya can’t get very far in studying St. Thomas Aquinas without knowing that he is all over Aristotle—wrote commentaries on all his major works. So, for example, we find that Thomas will quote Aristotle on the whole tabula rasa thing. In fact, Thomas bought into Aristotle’s whole account of how we come to know things, including the notion that ALL of our knowledge comes to us through our SENSES: it’s right there in the Summa Theologica, and you can read about it in English HERE or in Latin HERE.

So to say that Aquinas couldn’t have meant the five ways as demonstrations because they start from sense knowledge is—well, ignorant! It’s typical Ray Moose, folks; the best thing to do is IGNORE HIM.

KIDDNAPPED

The folks over at Catholic Answers are not ignorant. In fact, they specialize in a kind of direct, clear, facts-checked style of writing that is the bane of ignorance. I was hardly surprised, therefore, to find that Catholic Answers has come under attack by Ray Moose. What took me off guard was the bold insidiousness of the attack.

A recent issue of Catholic Answer's This Rock Magazine features an article supposedly by the associate editor, James Kidd. Kidd supposedly maintains that Thomas Aquinas did not intend his famous "five ways" as demonstrations of God's existence but as five arguments about or perspectives upon God's existence, and procedes to find fault with the arguments on various grounds such as that we might just all be dreaming instead living in the real world.

I hear my reader’s voice: "You've got to be Kidding." But I am not.

James Kidd clearly did not write this. James Kidd is a very pleasant and intelligent man whom I never met once in a sushi bar in San Diego, a man whose firm conviction that sushi bars really exist in San Diego makes it impossible that he would pen the above-mentioned article. Are you sitting down? Cause this may come as a shock.

James has been kidnapped by Ray Moose. The whole article is a forgery.

The claim is outlandish, I know, but I can back it up by showing just how ignorant the article is, and therefore how impossible it would be for James Kidd to have written the thing. This will be the burden, not only of this post, but of several posts to come. For the present, I will focus on one particularly silly claim, namely that we can see that St. Thomas did not intend the five ways to be taken as true demonstrations because

Thomas never refers to the five arguments as "proofs" in the modern sense of the term. In the preceding article (ST 1:2:2), he asks "whether it can be demonstrated that God exists" (Utrum Deum esse sit demonstrabile). The word demonstrabile has a precise meaning in Latin as a logical, geometrical proof. Thomas then proceeds to argue that the existence of God can be established by this kind of proof. But in article 3, Thomas suddenly abandons the language of hard proof in favor of a softer term: "Deum esse quinque viis probari potest," usually translated "The existence of God can be proved in five ways." But, unlike the narrow meaning of demonstrabile, the word probari has a wider meaning that does not necessitate a rigorous, irrefutable proof. A more accurate translation would be "The existence of God can be argued for in five ways."

Ray Moose—I refuse to call the author “James Kidd”—rarely states a flat falsehood; he prefers to say what is only partially true, and then capitalize on the part that isn’t. This is a case in point. Probare is a “wider” term than demonstrare, but it is not a “softer” term. There is no opposition here between “hard proof” and “soft argument”; in fact, every demonstrare is a probare, even if not every probare is a demonstrare. This is why an objector in Question 46, Article 2 of the Summa can say that demonstrative probari potest quod Deus sit causa effective mundi, “It can be demonstratively proven that God is the effective cause of the world.” You can probare something demonstrative.

OK, back to the question about God’s existence. Unknown to Ray, St. Thomas takes up several of the same arguments for God’s existence in another book, the Summa contra gentiles. In the last part of book 1, chapter 9, St. Thomas outlines what he will do in the following chapters, and there he indicates what will be his first task:

Inter ea vero quae de Deo secundum seipsum consideranda sunt, pramittendum est, quasi totius operis necessarium fundamentum, consideration qua demonstrator Deum esse.

“Among those things which are to be considered concerning God in Himself, one must set out first, as a sort of necessary foundation of the whole work, the consideration by which it is demonstrated that God exists.”

Keep in mind that this is his introduction to the SAME ARGUMENTS as those he uses in the Summa, and he says that by this consideration it is “demonstrated” (demonstratur) that God exists.

Then we find the same movement of thought as in the Summa: first he takes up the position that proving God’s existence is not necessary, either because it is self-evident (ch 10) or because we can only know it by faith (ch 12); then he procedes to his arguments for God’s existence (ch 13). We also find the same move in terminology:

Ostenso igitur quod non est vanum niti ad demonstrandum Deum esse, procedamus ad ponendum rationes quibus tam philosophi quam doctores Catholici Deum esse probaverunt.

“Having shown therefore that it is not useless to try to demonstrate that God exists, let us procede to set out the reasonings by which both the philosophers and the Catholic doctors have proven that God exists.”

Whoah! Did you see how he changed from demonstrare to probare?! Does this mean that, somewhere between the last line of chapter 9 and the first line of chapter 13 he has changed his mind and doesn’t really thing that his arguments will demonstrate God’s existence?

Turns out, the answer is “No.” After reviewing two versions of the argument from motion in gruesome detail, he notes two possible objections. With regard to the second, he says,

Secundum est, quod supponitur in praedictis demonstrationibus primum motum, scilicet corpus caeleste, esse motum ex se.

“The second [objection] is that it is supposed in the demonstrations just given that the first thing moved, namely the heavely body, is moved by itself.”

In referring to the arguments from motion, he still uses the word demonstratio, “demonstration.” In other words, he thinks that—as the objector from Question 46, Article 2 put it—he has demonstratively proven that God exists, with no opposition between the words demonstrate and prove.

You see then how silly and ignorant Ray’s argument is! But this only scratches the surface; in my next post, I will touch on the most ignorant argument of all….